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Abstract. The concept of networked microgrids, which refers to a cluster of mi-
crogrids connected with each other, has emerged in the literature as a conse-
quence of the increasing development of renewable energy. Energy management 
systems have been developed for planning, monitoring and controlling the power 
exchange into networked microgrids. Their main components are optimization 
algorithms for power exchange management. Several optimization algorithms 
based on coalition formation games were proposed to minimize distribution and 
transformation power loss of networked microgrids. Unlike these approaches, 
this paper proposes a non-lineal model based on canonical coalitional game for 
power exchange management of networked microgrids. To show the perfor-
mance of the proposed model, results of the model and results of an algorithm 
based on coalition formation games recently reported in the literature are com-
pared with. The main conclusion of this work is, when the objective is to mini-
mize total power losses, the problem of power exchange management of net-
worked microgrids should be modelled as a canonical coalition games and not as 
coalition formation games. 
1 Introduction 
Electrical microgrids integrate renewable energy sources as solar panels or wind tur-
bines, controllable distributed generators as fuel cells or micro turbines and battery en-
ergy storage systems to meet local loads demand [1].  
With the increasing development of renewable energy, the concept of multi-microgrids 
[2] or networked microgrids [3] has emerged in the literature, which refers to a cluster 
of microgrids connected with each other. The aim of networked microgrids is to achieve 
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resilience and stability through power exchange among them and smooth the incorpo-
ration of distributed generation into power systems [4].  
The intermittent nature of wind and solar power could cause energy deficit or excess at 
different times of the day. This poses new challenges to the power exchange manage-
ment of networked microgrids [5]. 
Responding to these challenges, Energy Management Systems (EMS) have been de-
veloped for planning, monitoring and controlling the power exchange into networked 
microgrids. The three classical management system architectures, centralized, decen-
tralized and hybrid, where proposed to design EMS for networked microgrids. A sum-
mary of these EMS architectures and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses 
can be found in recent literature [6]. 
Main components of EMS for networked microgrids are optimization algorithms for 
power exchange management [7]. Several optimization algorithms based on coalition 
formation games, also known as coalition structure formation, were proposed to mini-
mize distribution and transformation power loss of networked microgrids connected to 
a macro station.  
A coalition structure of a set of microgrids MG = {1, …, N} is defined as the set of 
disjoint coalitions Π = {S1, S2, … , Sn}. The number of coalition structure that can be 
formed is exponential in the number of microgrids N, and, more importantly, it is huge 
even relative to the number of coalitions 2N.The size of ΠN is the number of partitions 
of a set of size N, which is known as a Bell number BN. This number can be shown to 
satisfy (N/4)N/2 ≤ BN< NN. This implies that the direct enumeration approach will take 
super-polynomial time [8]. So, heuristic based algorithms were proposed for finding 
good coalition structures. Particularly, a coalition formation algorithm based on merge 
and split rules that uses the Pareto order concept for merging or splitting decisions was 
proposed [9]. Based on this last algorithm, different approaches, which use distance 
threshold between microgrids and/or pricing mechanism to limits the number of coali-
tion structures to be analysed, have been proposed for power exchange management of 
networked microgrids [5] [10–13]. The main drawback of these algorithms is that, a 
value function verifying the superadditivity property could be defined by considering 
total power losses by transmission and transformation due to energy exchanged be-
tween microgrids and with the macro station to meet the power balance of a coalition. 
The superadditivity property of the value function guarantees that grand coalition is the 
best coalition structure.  
Some approaches based on the grand coalition (canonical coalitional games) were pro-
posed in the literature. But, unlike this work, they are focused on different network 
topology; apply a lineal model for computing power losses instead of the conventional 
AC Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) non-lineal model [4]; are focused on both the con-
tractual aspects of the electricity market [14] or the battery usage aspects [15] without 
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considering transmission and transformation power losses; or are limited to only con-
sider the energy exchange between two microgrids [16].  
This paper proposes a non-lineal model based on canonical coalitional game for power 
exchange management of networked microgrids interconnected with the main grid 
through a macro station. To show the performance of the proposed model, results of the 
model and results of an algorithm based on coalition formation games recently reported 
in the literature are compared with. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the networked 
microgrids topology in which the work is focused; Section 3 presents the canonical 
coalitional game based model for power exchange management proposed in this work; 
Section 4 presents a comparative analysis of results of both the proposed canonical 
coalitional games based model and the coalition formation games based algorithm re-
cently reported in the literature. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and future 
work. 
2 Topology of networked microgrids 
A distributed network composed of a set of microgrids MG={1, …, N} and a macro 
station MS connected to the main grid through a transformer is considered (Figure 1). 
The main grid operates at high voltage, while energy can be exchanged between mi-
crogrids at medium voltage. A Central Controller CC coordinates the energy power 
transmission of a microgrid. Central controllers are interconnected and each knows the 
generation and demand forecasts of the microgrid that it coordinates.  
 
Fig. 1. Topology of a set of networked microgrids. 
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For a given time period, usually of one hour, a power production forecast P i and a 
load demand forecast Di for each microgrid i∊MG are generated. Based on these fore-
casts, the power surplus (Qi = Pi - Di > 0) or the power deficit (Qi = Pi - Di < 0) is 
calculated, which defines the state Qi of microgrid i∊MG. The state of networked mi-
crogrid set MG for the time period is defined as Q = {Q1, …, QN }.  
3 Canonical coalitional games based model 
Grand coalition S involves all microgrids i∊MG. Microgrids with power surplus (Qi 
> 0) define the seller set MGS and microgrids with power deficit (Qi < 0) define the 
buyer set MGB. So, grand coalition S = MGS ⋃ MGB = MG.   
Definition1: for a given state Q = {Q1,, …., QN } of networked microgrid set MG, a 
power exchange strategy defines the power that microgrids i∊MGS and microgrids 
j∊MGB exchanges between them and with macro station m∊MS to meet the power 
balance of grand coalition S.   
Definition 2: when microgrids exchange energy between them only transmission power 
loss should be considered and, when the macro station intervenes, transmission and 
transformation power loss should be considered.  
Definition 3: an optimum power exchange strategy minimizes transmission and trans-
formation power losses of grand coalition S. 
Definition 4: when microgrid i∊MGS delivers power 𝐾𝑖𝑚  to macro station m∊MS, 
power loss by transmission and transformation 𝑃𝑖𝑚
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 is given by Equations 1.a and 1.b. 
[10] 
𝑃𝑖𝑚
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠  =  𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑚 ∗  𝐾𝑖𝑚
2 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑚                                                                        (1.a) 
𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑚 =   
𝑅𝑖𝑚
𝑈𝑖𝑚
2   (1.b) 
Where, Rim is the resistance of distribution line, β is the power lost fraction by power 
transformation at macro station and Uim is the tension over distribution line. 
Definition 5: when microgrid j∊MGB receives power 𝑃𝑚𝑗  from macro station m∊MS, 
power loss by transmission and transformation 𝑃𝑚𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 is given by Equations 2.a and 2.b. 
[10] 
𝑃𝑚𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠  =  𝑅𝑈𝑚𝑗 ∗  𝐾𝑚𝑗
2 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝐾𝑚𝑗                                                                             (2.a) 
𝑅𝑈𝑚𝑗 =   
𝑅𝑚𝑗
𝑈𝑚𝑗
2   (2.b) 
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Where, 𝐾𝑚𝑗  is the power that macro station m∊MS delivers to ensure microgrid j∊MGB 
receives power 𝑃𝑚𝑗 . It is given by Equations 3.a and 3.b. [10] 
𝐾𝑚𝑗  =  𝑃𝑚𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝑃𝑚𝑗  (3.a) 
𝐾𝑚𝑗  = 𝑅𝑈𝑚𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑚𝑗
2 +  𝛽 ∗  𝐾𝑚𝑗 +  𝑃𝑚𝑗                                                    (3.b) 
Parameters, variables and sets .  
S: coalition of microgrids S ⊆ MG   
MGS ⊆ S: set of microgrids seller with power surplus (Qi> 0) that participate of grand 
coalition S. 
MGB ⊆ S: set of microgrids buyer with power deficit (Qi < 0) that participate of grand 
coalition S.  
MGB ⋃ MGS = S. 
MGB ∩ MGS = Ø. 
MS = {m}: set of macro station. 
𝑃𝑖𝑗:   Power received by microgrid j∊MGB from microgrid i∊MGS. 
𝐾𝑖𝑗:   Power delivered from microgrid i∊MGS to microgrid j∊MGB. 
𝑃𝑖𝑚:  Power received by macro station m∊MS from microgrid i∊MGS. 
𝐾𝑖𝑚:  Power delivered from microgrid i∊MGS to macro station m∊MS. 
𝑃𝑚𝑗 : Power received by microgrid j∊MGB from m∊MS. 
𝐾𝑚𝑗:  Power delivered from macro station m∊MS to microgrid j∊MGB. 
Qi: power offered by microgrid i∊MGS (Qi = Qi). 
Qj: power required by microgrid j∊MGB (Qj = - Qj). 
RU: resistance of distribution line divided by square tension over distribution line. 
β: fraction of power lost by transformation at macro station m∊MS. 
Objective Function.  
The objective function u({S}) is defined as total power losses by transmission and 
transformation due to the power exchanged among microgrids and the power ex-
changed with macro station m∊MS to meet the power balance of coalition S (Equation 
4).   
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑢({𝑆}) =  ∑ [𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑗
2 ] + ∑ [𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑚 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑚
2 ] +𝑖∈𝑆 ∑ [𝑅𝑈𝑚𝑗 ∗𝑗∈𝑆𝑖≠𝑗∈𝑆
𝐾𝑚𝑗
2 ] + 𝛽 ∗ ( ∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑚 + ∑ 𝐾𝑚𝑗𝑗∈𝑀𝐺𝐵𝑖∈𝑀𝐺𝑆  )    (4) 
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Constrains.  
Power received by microgrid j∊MGB from microgrid i∊MGS (Equation 5). 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝐾𝑖𝑗 − 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑗
2     ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝐺𝑆, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝐺𝐵   (5) 
Power received by macro station m∊MS  from microgrid i∊MGS (Equation 6).  
𝑃𝑖𝑚 = 𝐾𝑖𝑚 − 𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑚 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑚
2 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑚   ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝐺𝑆, ∀ 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑆                   (6) 
Power received by microgrid j∊MGB from macro station m∊MS (Equation 7). 
𝑃𝑚𝑗 = 𝐾𝑚𝑗 − 𝑅𝑈𝑚𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑚𝑗
2 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐾𝑚𝑗   ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝐺𝐵, ∀ 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑆                 (7) 
Power balance of microgrid i∊MGS (Equation 8). 
𝐾𝑖𝑚 + ∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑗 = 𝑄𝑖𝑗∈𝑀𝐺𝐵   ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝐺𝑆  (8) 
Power balance of microgrid j∊MGB (Equation 9). 
𝑃𝑚𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑄𝑗𝑖∈𝑆   ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝐺𝐵            (9) 
The optimization model could be used for generating the optimum power exchange 
strategy of any coalition S ⊆ MG. 
Definition 6: the function value v(S) of coalition S is v(S) = min u({S}). 
It should be noted that any collation S = S’⋃{i} verifies v(S) ≤ min u({S’}) + v({i}). 
So, value function v(S) verifies the superadditivity property. This property ensures that 
function value v(S) of grand coalition S = MG will be smaller that the function value 
v(S’) of any coalition S’⊂MG.  
Definition 7: an individual coalition S involves a single microgrid that exchanges its 
power surplus or deficit with the main grid through the macro station.  
When microgrid i∊MGS delivers power 𝐾𝑖𝑚 = Qi to macro station m∊MS, power loss 
by transmission and transformation 𝑃𝑖𝑚
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 is defined by Equation 1 and, when microgrid 
j∊MGB receives power 𝑃𝑚𝑗 = - Qi from macro station m∊MS, power loss by transmis-
sion and transformation 𝑃𝑚𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 is defined by Equation 2. So, the corresponding value 
functions of individual coalitions {i} and {j} are defined by Equations 10 and 11. 
𝑣({𝑖}) = 𝑢({𝑖}) =  𝑃𝑖𝑚
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠                                                                                                        (10) 
𝑣({𝑖}) = 𝑢({𝑗}) =  𝑃𝑚𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠                 (11) 
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4 Canonical Coalitional Games vs. Coalition Formation Games  
The comparative analysis was performed for a 12-MG and a 24-MG networks recently 
reported in the literature [5]. Parameters values in both scenarios are: resistance of dis-
tribution lines R =0.2 Ω/km; power lost fraction by power transformation at macro sta-
tion β = 0.03; tension over distribution line between microgrids Uij=25kv and between 
a microgrid and the macro station Uim=50kv. Only active power exchange is consid-
ered. 
For a given time period, the state reported for the12-MG network, existing connections 
and microgrid locations are reported in Figure 2. Seller set MGS = {3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12} 
and buyer set MGB = {1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 11}.  
 
Fig. 2. Location for the12-MG network [km], reported states Q [MW], and existing connec-
tions. 
Figure 3 shows the state reported for 24-MG network, existing connections and mi-
crogrid locations. Seller set is MGS={4, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24} and 
buyer set MGB={ 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20}.  
For both cases, 12-MG and 24-MG networks, it is was assumed that microgrids sepa-
rated by a distance less than 14,5 km are connected with electric lines and are capable 
to power exchange between them and all microgrid are connected with the macro sta-
tion [5].  
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Fig. 3. Location for the24-MG network [km], reported states Q [MW], and existing connec-
tions. 
4.1 Results of the Canonical Coalitional Games based model 
Results obtained for 12-MG network by using the canonical coalitional games based 
model proposed in this work are summarized on Table 1. D is the power delivered from 
either microgrid i∊MGS or macro station m∊MS. R is the power received by either 
microgrid j∊MGB or macro station m∊MS. L is the transmission and transformation 
loss. The total loss for 12-MG network is v(S) = 29 MW. 
Table 1. Results of the canonical coalitional games based model for the 12-MG network. 
 
 
D Delivered
L Loss
R Received D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R Ki =Qi
3 31,0 2,6 28,4 31,0
5 39,9 2,8 37,1 6,1 0,1 6,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 46,0
6 31,3 2,2 29,1 6,7 0,2 6,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 38,0
8 33,3 3,0 30,2 25,0 2,1 22,9 29,7 2,4 27,3 88,0
10 25,8 1,6 24,2 2,2 0,1 2,1 28,0
12 36,7 3,0 33,7 30,1 2,1 28,1 19,2 1,3 17,9 86,0
Pmj 16,2 0,8 15,3 27,5 1,7 25,8 3,0 0,1 2,9 8,1 0,4 7,8 27,0 2,2 24,8 5,9 0,2 5,7 29,0
Pj =Qj MW91,0
       j∊MGB  
i∊
M
G
S
Kim
Total Loss 
v(S)41,0
1197421
38,031,050,049,0
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Results obtained for 24-MG network by using the canonical coalitional games based 
model are summarized on Table 2. The total loss for 24-MG network is v(S) = 53.8 
MW. 
The proposed model was solved by using LINGO 17.0 x64. The run time for both cases 
was less than 1 second running on a PC, Intel i7, 32Gb RAM. 
Table 2. Results of the canonical coalitional games based model for the 24-MG network. 
 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show for each MG into the set of seller, the power they send, the loss 
produced by transmission and the power that will be received by the MG into the set 
of buyers. For example, for the 12-MG network scenario, the MG12 places D=36.7 
MW of power at MG1's disposal. MG1 receives R=33.7 MW of power because the 
transmission losses are L=3 MW. MG1 buys the availability of power to the macro 
station of R=15.3 MW. Due to the fact that L=0.8 MW of transmission and transfor-
mation losses are produced, the macro station must supply D=16.2 MW. MG12, after 
commercializing with MG4, sells its surplus to the D=19.2 MW macro station, but 
due to transformation and transmission losses, the macro station receives L=17.9 
MW. 
D Delivered
L Loss
R Received D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R
4 15,5 0,6 14,9
7 38,2 1,9 36,3 35,9 2,4 33,5
8
12 18,4 0,4 18,0 39,1 2,3 36,9
13 2,8 0,0 2,8
15
18 20,1 0,9 19,1
19 20,0 0,6 19,4 15,2 0,7 14,5
21 35,3 2,1 33,3
22
23
24
Pmj 11,9 0,7 11,2 4,3 0,2 4,1 5,5 0,2 5,3 32,4 2,7 29,7 13,8 0,8 13,0
Pj =Qj 48 18 41 61 63 61
D Delivered
L Loss
R Received D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R D L R Ki =Qi
4 24,2 1,4 22,8 18,2 0,8 17,5 58
7 7,2 0,2 7,0 8,8 0,4 8,4 90
8 23,5 1,3 22,2 6,5 0,2 6,3 30
12 22,0 1,3 20,6 16,5 0,9 15,6 96
13 11,3 0,3 11,0 2,9 0,0 2,8 17
15 34,6 3,7 30,9 24,4 1,8 22,6 59
18 14,9 0,9 14,0 21,0 1,0 20,0 56
19 16,7 1,1 15,6 3,1 0,0 3,0 55
21 9,6 0,3 9,3 22,1 1,2 20,8 67
22 32,0 1,3 30,7 32
23 16,0 1,2 14,8 16
24 41,5 6,0 35,5 32,5 3,5 29,0 74
Pmj 39,4 2,8 36,5 27,7 1,9 25,8 7,4 0,3 7,1 22,7 1,3 21,4 29,1 2,3 26,8 53,8
Pj =Qj 100 79 34 71 98 10 MW
i∊
M
G
S
              j∊MGB         
              j∊MGB         
Kim
Total Loss 
v(S)
201716141110
i∊
M
G
S
965321
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4.2 Results of the Coalition Formation Game based algorithm 
Coalition structures Π = {S1, S2, … , Sn} reported in literature [5] as those obtained by 
using an heuristic coalition formation algorithm based on merge and split rules, the 
Pareto order concept, distance threshold between microgrids and a pricing mechanism, 
are evaluated. The minimum loss of each coalition Si∊Π was obtained by using the 
canonical coalitional games based model. Results obtained for both the 12-MG and 24-
MG networks are summarized on Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3. Losses of the coalition structure Π12MG = {CI, CII, CIII, CIV, MG3} reported for the 12-
MG network [5]  
 
Table 4. Losses of the coalition structure Π24MG = {I, II, III, IV, V, VI, MG10, MG22} reported 
for the 24-MG network [5] 
 
 
The literature reports run times of 1.06 seconds for executing the heuristic coalition 
formation algorithm running on an Intel Processor 5Y70 CPU 1.3 GHz environment. 
4.3 Results analysis  
The minimum power loss obtained for Coalition I = {MG8, MG7, MG11} (Table 3) by 
using the model based on canonical coalitional games is v(Coalition I) = 12.89 MW, 
which is close to the 11.20 MW reported in the literature. This difference is due trans-
mission and transformation losses of Coalition I produced by the sale to the macro sta-
tion of its power surplus (10.2% of the 88 MW of power surplus of MG8) are not ac-
counted for. 
Coalitional Loss [MW]
Coalition I mg8, mg7, mg11 V(CI) 12,89
Coalition II mg10, mg2 V(CII) 4,8
Coalition III mg5, mg6, mg9 V(CIII) 11,68
Coalition IV mg1, mg4, mg12 V(CIV) 10,54
Individual Coalition mg3 V(mg3) 0,93
V(Π12MG) 40,84Total Losses [MW]  
1
2
-M
G
Coalitional Loss [MW]
Coalition I mg8, mg15, mg11 V(CI) 8,83
Coalition II mg14, mg3, mg12, mg2 V(CII) 5,34
Coalition III mg7, mg5, mg19, mg9, mg20 V(CIII) 7,74
Coalition IV mg16, mg18, mg4, mg13, mg1 V(CIV) 8,35
Coalition V mg21, mg6 V(CV) 6,1
Coalition VI mg23, mg24, mg17 V(CVI) 16,95
Individual Coalition mg10 V(mg10) 18,7
Individual Coalition mg22 V(mg22) 1,34
V(Π24MG) 73,35Total Losses [MW]
2
4
-M
G
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Comparing the total power loss value reported in Table 1 (29 MW) with that reported 
in Table 3 (40.84 MW) for the 12-MG network, it can be seen that the model based on 
canonical coalition games allowed to obtain an energy exchange strategy that reduces 
power loss by 29%.  
A similar analysis of total power loss value reported in Table 2 (53.8 MW) and that 
reported in Table 4 (73.35 MW) for the 24-MG network yields a power loss reduction 
of 26%. 
5 Conclusion and future work 
A non-lineal model based on canonical coalitional game for power exchange manage-
ment of networked microgrids interconnected with the main grid through a macro sta-
tion was presented.  
The model was used for generating the power exchange strategy that minimizes the 
power loss for two scenarios recently reported in the literature: 12-MG network and a 
24-MG network. The performance of the proposed model was assessed by comparing, 
for each scenario, power loss values obtained for the grand coalition with that obtained 
by summing the power loss of each coalition in the coalition structure reported in liter-
ature. The power loss reduction obtained for each scenario shows the good performance 
of the proposed model when comparing with a recently proposed coalition formation 
game based algorithm. In other words, results shows that, even though heuristics algo-
rithms can find good coalition structure different of the grand coalition, the grand coa-
lition is the best. So, taken into account that running times of both approaches are sim-
ilar, investing time and effort in looking for these good structures is not justified. 
As conclusion of this work, the following issues must be emphasizes: 
 Coalition structure games were developed for modelling coalition games which 
value function does not verify the superadditivity property. But, as it is shown in 
this work, transmission and transformation power losses of networked microgrids 
define a value function that verifies the superadditivity property. So, the problem 
of to define a power exchange strategy for networked microgrids that minimizes 
total power losses must be modelled as a canonical coalition games. 
 The proposed model is not only better in terms of power loss reduction when com-
pared with those based on coalition structure formation, but also, it has the value 
of being independent of distance thresholds between microgrids and/or pricing 
mechanisms. 
 Even though the benefit distribution is a central issue of coalitional games for 
which different fairness criteria, such as egalitarian fair, Shapley value, core, nu-
cleolus and proportional division were proposed, the scope of this work was lim-
ited to analyse the canonical coalition games versus the coalition structure games 
as modelling strategy of the problem of power exchange management of net-
worked microgrids. 
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Future works will be focused on to develop a planning and execution monitoring model 
for a hybrid EMS architecture.  
References 
[1] Wang D, Qiu J, Reedman L, Meng K, Lai LL. Two-stage energy management for 
networked microgrids with high renewable penetration. Applied Energy 
2018;226:39–48. 
[2] Gil NJ, Lopes JAP. Hierarchical Frequency Control Scheme for Islanded Multi-
Microgrids Operation: Lausanne, Switzerland, 1 - 5 July 2007. IEEE Lausanne 
Power Tech, 2007 2007:473–8. 
[3] Ren L, Qin Y, Li Y, Zhang P, Wang B, Luh PB et al. Enabling resilient distributed 
power sharing in networked microgrids through software defined networking. 
Applied Energy 2018;210:1251–65. 
[4] Du Y, Wang Z, Liu G, Chen X, Yuan H, Wei Y et al. A cooperative game ap-
proach for coordinating multi-microgrid operation within distribution systems. 
Applied Energy 2018;222:383–95. 
[5] Mei J, Chen C, Wang J, Kirtley JL. Coalitional game theory based local power 
exchange algorithm for networked microgrids. Applied Energy 2019;239:133–
41. 
[6] Hussain A, Bui V-H, Kim H-M. A Resilient and Privacy-Preserving Energy Man-
agement Strategy for Networked Microgrids. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 
2018;9(3):2127–39. 
[7] Xu Y, Zhang W, Liu W. Distributed Dynamic Programming-Based Approach for 
Economic Dispatch in Smart Grids. IEEE Trans. Ind. Inf. 2015;11(1):166–75. 
[8] Chalkiadakis G, Wooldridge MJ, Elkind E (eds.). Computational aspects of co-
operative game theory. [San Rafael, Calif.]: Morgan & Claypool Publishers; op. 
2012. 
[9] Apt KR, Witzel A. A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation. 
[10] Walid Saad, Han Z, Poor HV. Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Micro-
Grid Distribution Network // Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Micro-
Grid Distribution Networks 2011:1–5. 
[11] Jadhav AM, Patne NR, Guerrero JM. A Novel Approach to Neighborhood Fair 
Energy Trading in a Distribution Network of Multiple Microgrid Clusters. IEEE 
Trans. Ind. Electron. 2018:1. 
[12] Koohi-Kamali S, Rahim NA. Coordinated control of smart microgrid during and 
after islanding operation to prevent under frequency load shedding using energy 
storage system. Energy Conversion and Management 2016;127:623–46. 
[13] Chakraborty S, Nakamura S, Okabe T. Real-time energy exchange strategy of 
optimally cooperative microgrids for scale-flexible distribution system. Expert 
Systems with Applications 2015;42(10):4643–52. 
SIIIO, Simposio Argentino de Informática Industrial e Investigación Operativa
48JAIIO - SIIIO - ISSN: 2618-3277 - Página 99
[14] Muddasser Alam, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Alex Rogers, Gini M, Intelligence 
ASIGoAM. Cooperative energy exchange for the efficient use of energy and re-
sources in remote communities // Proceedings of the 2013 international confer-
ence on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. St. Paul, MN, USA: Inter-
national Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2013. 
[15] Castro J, Gómez D, Tejada J. Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based 
on sampling. Computers & Operations Research 2009;36(5):1726–30. 
[16] Rahbar K, Chai CC, Zhang R. Energy Cooperation Optimization in Microgrids 
with Renewable Energy Integration // Energy Cooperation Optimization in Mi-
crogrids With Renewable Energy Integration. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 2016 // 
2018;9(2):1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIIIO, Simposio Argentino de Informática Industrial e Investigación Operativa
48JAIIO - SIIIO - ISSN: 2618-3277 - Página 100
